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"OUT OF TOUCH:" THE DIMINISHED
VIABILITY OF THE TOUCH AND CONCERN
REQUIREMENT IN THE LAW OF
SERVITUDES
by Paula A. Franzese*
In the law of real property, the term "servitude" refers
rather generically to any privately created, nonpossessory interest in the land of another, which binds successive owners or occupiers.' This somewhat simple construct, however, belies the
infamous complexity and analytical confusion to typically attend
application of the various species of servitudes,2 principally, 3 the
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. A.B., Barnard College. J.D., Columbia University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Richard Ballot for his indispensable research assistance.
1 See, e.g., R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 8.1, at 435 (1984); J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 825 (2d ed. 1988); 2
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 315, at 2-14 (1980); Reichman, Toward a Unified
Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1181 (1982).
2 See, e.g., E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL PROPERTY LAW 480 (2d ed. 1982)

(deeming servitudes law "an unspeakable quagmire"); French, Toward a Modem Law
of Servitudrs: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1982) (describing the law of servitudes as "the most complex and archaic body of American law
remaining in the twentieth century."); Reichman, supra note 1, at 1179 (servitudes
law "remains a murky subject burdened with obsolete forms and rules that have
caused confusion and uncertainty"); see alsoJ. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 1,
at 826 ("[I]t is far easier to understand this disorderly law from the perspective of
history than as a logical system.").
s The law of servitudes includes two minor forms: the license and the profit.
Typically, the license is a freely revocable entitlement to enter the land of another
for some limited purpose. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 512 (1944). The profit
permits one to remove from another's land those resources, such as timber and
minerals, deemed a natural incident of the land. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 450, special note (1944). In the United States, profits are subject to the same
rules as easements. Id.
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easement,4 the real covenant 5 and the equitable servitude.6 The
evolution and present-day construction of the so-called touch
and concern requirement,7 long a classic prerequisite to a given
covenant's enforceability by and against successors,' offers a
ready illustration of this antiquated quagmire.
4 The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1936) defines the easement as follows:

§ 450 Easement
An easement is an interest in land in the possession of another
which
(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him to protection as against third persons from interference in such use or enjoyment;
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land;
(d) is not a normal incident of the possession of any land possessed by the owner of the interest, and
(e) is capable of creation by conveyance.
Id.
5 The real covenant is a promise pertaining to land use that is enforceable as a
matter of law, in a suit for damages. See 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & A. SMITH,
BASIC PROPERTY LAW 610 (4th ed. 1984). If certain requirements are satisfied, the
covenant is enforceable by or against successors to the originally contracting parties. See R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 764-67 (5th ed.
1984); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §§ 670-79 (P. Rohan, rev. ed.
1990); See infra notes 15-54 and accompanying text.
6 According to the Restatement of Property, the equitable servitude results "solely
from the enforceability in equity of a promise respecting the use of land." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 (1944). The promise may not satisfy all of the stringent
prerequisites to enforceability as a real covenant (typically, the requisite privity is
absent), but nonetheless, under certain circumstances, may be upheld in a court of
equity, where injunctive relief would be decreed. As a matter of fundamental fairness, the equitable servitude could bind successors who took with notice. The doctrine was created in the celebrated case of Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.
1848). See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.26 (A. Casner 1952); C. CLARK, REAL
COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND 171-72 (2d ed.
1947); 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 861, at 489 (3d ed. 1939); Berger, A Policy
Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 217 (1970);
McLoone, Equitable Servitudes - A Recent Case and Its Implicationsfor the Enforcement of
Covenants Not to Compete, 9 ARIZ. L. REV. 441 (1968). As a general matter, it has
been aptly observed that "[n]otoriously vague boundary lines" separate the three
categories of servitudes. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 883, 883 (1988).
7 See generally C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 99 (to touch and concern, promise must
be "intimately bound up with the land"); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944)
(promise must affect physical use or enjoyment of the property); see infra notes 5-50
and accompanying text.
8 Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583) (covenant concerning land use will
not be enforceable against successors unless requisite intent is present and promise
touches and concerns the land); McLoone, supra note 6, at 447 (touch and concern
test explicitly or implicitly applies to all servitudes, insofar as "any restrictive easement necessitates some relation between the restriction and the land itself"); see
infra notes 5-50 and accompanying text.
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As a general matter, the value of any given servitude resides
primarily in its ability to bind successors, thereby enduring
changes in ownership without the need for renegotiation or
assignment.9 This permanence, which facilitates interests of certainty and stability, also inspired considerable judicial ambivalence.' ° Servitudes can hinder free alienability of land, distort
development or unduly cloud title. In part, these risks prompted
nineteenth century English courts to create a series of confining
prerequisites to the particular covenant's ability to bind successors," including bewildering rules about privity12 and touching
and concerning the land. 13 American courts modified some of
the English doctrine, but retained a host of restrictions that, at
least in theory and in rhetoric, valued unencumbered marketability of land more than private land use restrictions.' 4
Thus, in the morass of servitudes law, it has been axiomatic
9 French, Design Proposalfor the New Restatement of Property - Servitudes, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1988). See also Berger, supra note 6, at 168 ("It was early
apparent that unless agreements . . . respecting the use of land were binding not
only upon the promisor... who entered into them but also upon purchasers from
him, such undertakings would be worthless, since otherwise they could be avoided
by a mere transfer to a third party.").
10 For a concise and compelling discussion of the law of servitudes' historical
development, see Reichman, supra note 1, at 1184-90; French, supra note 9, at 121421.
"1 See Reichman, supra note 1, at 1189-90 ("English courts feared that recognition of new types of servitudes would result in a heavy encumbrance of titles, which
in turn would impede assignability."); French, supra note 9, at 1215 (in part because
of various economic and social risks, and "[i]n part . . . because of an inadequate
public land records system in England, nineteenth century courts responded ambivalently toward servitudes"); see generally R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 5, at
725; Comment, Real Covenants in Restraintof Trade - When Do They Run With the Land?,
20 ALA. L. REV. 114, 115 (1967) (English courts sought "to effectuate a policy
against encumbrances on land use by limiting and discouraging covenants running
with land").
12 For the burden of a covenant to bind successors, there must be "privity," in
other words, some legally meaningful relationship between the originally contracting parties ("horizontal privity") as well as between the original promisor or
promisee and his successor in interest ("vertical privity"). See RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 534 (1944) (horizontal privity); id. at § 535 (vertical privity); infra note
31 and accompanying text. Privity of estate is not a prerequisite to the equitable
servitude's enforceability by and against successors. Id. at § 539 comment i.
13 The celebrated Spencer's Case first articulated in dicta the rule that a covenant
cannot run with the land at law or in equity unless it touches and concerns the land.
Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583) (to run, covenant must "touch or concern the thing demised"). See infra notes 14-47 and accompanying text.
14 See French, supra note 9, at 1216 (American courts recognized the need for
enforceable land use agreements, but "maintained a facade of restrictive rules and
grudging rhetoric").
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5 respecting real property will not
that a promise or covenant'
"run with the land"' 6 at law or in equity, i.e., it will not bind suc-

cessors in interest, unless it touches and concerns the land.' 7
This rule, firmly rooted for centuries,'" is applicable to real covenants as well as to equitable servitudes.' 9 Today, in most jurisdictions, the requirement is deemed satisfied if the value of the
given party's legal interest in land is affected by the covenant's
performance. ° In the parlance of real covenant analysis, the
doctrine requires that the "benefit" and the "burden ' 2' of the
15 In this setting, the words "promise" and "covenant"
are used
interchangeably.
16 See generally Berger, Integrationof the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 353-54 ("[W]hen it is said that the benefit runs to a new owner or possessor, it means that that new party can enforce the
servitude even though he has received no express agreement that he may. Likewise, when it is said that the burden runs to the new owner or possessor, it means
that he is bound to obey or perform the servitude just as if he had expressly agreed
to do so.").
17 As construed in Spencer's Case:
[I]f the thing to be done be merely collateral to the land, and doth not
touch and concern the thing demised in any sort, there the assignee
shall not be charged. As if the lessee covenants for him and his assignees to build a house upon the land of the lessor which is no parcel
of the demise, or to pay any collateral sum to the lessor, or to a stranger, it shall not bind the assignee, because it is merely collateral, in no
manner touches or concerns the thing that was demised, or that is
assigned over, and therefore in such case the assignee of the thing
demised cannot be charged with it, no more than any other stranger.
Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (O.B. 1583). See supra notes 14-16 and infra
notes 18-47 and accompanying text.
18 See supra notes 13-17 and infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
19 See generally Stake, Toward an Economic Understandingof Touch and Concern, 1988
DuKE L.J. 925, 927 n. 16 (touch and concern requirement pertains to real covenants
and to equitable servitudes).
20 R. PowEu.L, supra note 5, at § 673[2] ("The majority of courts and writers now
accept the test for the 'touching and concerning of covenants' proposed by Dean
Harry Bigelow." (citations omitted)); Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12
MIcH. L. REV. 639, 645-46 (1914) (covenant's benefit touches and concerns when it
renders promisee's interest in land more valuable; attendantly, covenant's burden
touches and concerns when promisor's interest in land is rendered less valuable as
a consequence of covenant's performance); cf. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 99 (to
touch and concern, promise must be "intimately bound up with the land"); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944) (promise must affect physical use or enjoyment of the property); Stake, supra note 19 (suggesting efficiency justification for
touch and concern requirement); Sterk, Freedomfrom Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 661 (1985) (advocating retention of some formulation of touch and concern doctrine, as "modest check against
externalities, inadequate foresight and intergenerational imposition").
21 The "benefit" of the covenant denotes the promisee's rights and entitlements. The promisor's duties are known as the "burden." See R. POWELL, supra
note 5, at § 673[2] n.30.
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given promise be analyzed separately.22
Accordingly, the benefit of a covenant will not run unless it
touches and concerns the land,2 3 a condition typically construed
to require that the covenant's performance render the promisee's
interest in land more valuable.2 4 The rule is sometimes expressed as satisfied if the covenant confers "a direct benefit on
the owner of land by reason of his ownership, ' 25 or if, in layperson's sensibilities, the given promise would be viewed as aiding
"the promisee as landowner. "26 Attendantly, the burden of a
covenant will not bind successors unless it too touches and concerns the land. 27 This is generally interpreted to mean that the
covenant's performance renders the promisor's interest in land
less valuable. 8 If the standard is satisfied as to both the benefit
and the burden, and if the requisite intent,2 9 notice 3 ° and privity3 ' are established, the covenant is enforceable against
22 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.13, at 374 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Stoebuck,
Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861, 874 (1977); Note,
Covenants Running With the Land: Viable Doctrine or Common-Law Relic?, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 139, 142 (1978).
23 See R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 516 (3d ed. 1981).
24 Bigelow, supra note 20, at 645; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25 National Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N.J.L. 173, 186 (Sup. Ct. 1877).
26 C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 99.
27 Id. at 111.
28 See Bigelow, supra note 20, at 645; see, e.g., Dick v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 115
Conn. 122, 160 A. 432 (1932) (burden of anticompetition covenant touched and
concerned when it restrained "use to which the land may be put in the future as
well as in the present, and which might very likely affect its value"); Singer v. Wong,
35 Conn. Supp. 640, 404 A.2d 124 (1978) (restrictive covenant to materially influence value of parcel satisfies touch and concern test).
29 The covenanting parties must intend that their promise bind successors in
interest. The requisite intent may be gleaned from express language such as,
"[piromisor hereby covenants, on behalf of himself, his successors and assigns .. " However, in many instances, the parties fail to specify explicitly whether
or not they intend the covenant to run. See Berger, supra note 6, at 173-79. In the
absence of express stipulation, courts typically will impute the requisite intent, so
long as to do so seems reasonably consistent with the parties' general understanding. See Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 359 (1986). But see Note, supra note 22, at 156 n.
105 (noting that successor must be expressly bound in at least six jurisdictions:
Georgia, Texas, California, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota).
30 To be bound, bonafide purchasers of the burdened parcel must have had notice of the encumbrance. R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 673[2][d]; Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861, 901 (1977). Notice may
be actual or constructive, with constructive notice imputed as a consequence of
proper recordation of the covenant (record notice) or as a result of the "lay of the
land" or such other factors as would lead a reasonable person to conduct an investigation which would reveal the restriction (inquiry notice). R. POWELL, supra note
5, at § 673[2][d].
31 In order for the burden of the covenant to run to successors, horizontal as
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assignees.3 2
The touch and concern requirement yielded anomalous results in the early American jurisprudence pertaining to covenants not to compete. 3 Judicial hostility towards encumbrances
on unfettered marketability and free trade3 4 sometimes precipitated the conclusion that agreements restricting competition do
not touch and concern the land.3 5 A number of cases, including,
well as vertical privity is required. Broadly stated, horizontal privity depends on the
existence of either a succession of estate between the original covenanting parties
or some "mutual and simultaneous" interest other than the covenant itself that is
shared by them. See R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 673[2][c] n. 113 (noting that most
jurisdictions endorse succession of estate interpretation, requiring that deed between promisor and promisee, transferring title to affected land, recite the covenant); Shade v. M. O'Keeffe, Inc., 260 Mass. 180, 156 N.E. 867 (1927) (espousing
so-called "Massachusetts rule," requiring that parties share some other "mutual
and simultaneous interest," such as an easement in the same parcel); RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 534 (1944) (attempting to synthesize two views by concluding that
horizontal privity contemplates either a mutual or successive relationship between
promisor and promisee). Vertical privity requires privity of estate between one of
the originally covenanting parties and a party to the lawsuit, and is present if, for
example, the successor received title to the affected parcel by inter vivos transfer or
devise. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.18 (A. Casner ed. 1952); J.
DUKEM!NIER & J. KRIER, supra note 1, at 894-95; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY,
§§ 530, 541 (1944). The benefit of the covenant will run so long as there is vertical
privity. The Restatement of Property declares, with some authority, that horizontal
privity is not required for the benefit to run. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 548
(1944). See generally C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 94, 95 (elaborating on technical requirements necessary for covenant to run with land); R. CUNNINGHAM, W.
STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, at § 8.18 (discussing horizontal privity requirement as applied to real covenants); R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 673[2][c]
(noting confusion in many jurisdictions as to what type of privity is required).
32 See R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 673.
33 In the land transactions setting, covenants not to compete may arise as
follows:
When A conveys Blackacre to B, A may wish to protect, against B's
competition, a business conducted by A on retained land adjacent to
Blackacre. Similarly, B may wish to protect, against A's competiton, a
business B proposes to conduct on Blackacre. Anticompetitive covenants purport to restrict the way in which the covenantor might otherwise use the burdened land.
R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 675[3][b] (citations omitted).
34 See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. Noncompetition covenants were
thought to promote monopolistic practices while impeding alienability. The early
American judicial ambivalence, if not disdain, towards anticompetition covenants is
traceable to the English common law. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hayward, 4 Exch. 311
(1869) (holding that benefit of covenant not to compete would not run to promisee's assignee, insofar as covenant relates not to land, but to manner in which land
could be occupied); cf Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136 (1837) (on similar facts,
court found in favor of assignee).
35 See, e.g., Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885) (Holmes, J.)
(covenant not to operate quarry does not touch and concern, since it does not benefit the land, but rather confers a personal benefit); Shade v. M. O'Keefe, Inc., 260
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quite notably, those decided by New Jersey courts,3 6 insisted that
as to the burdened estate, the requirement was satisfied only if
the given covenant affected the physical use of the land itself,3 7
thereby "exercising direct influence on the occupation, use or
enjoyment of the premises."3 " Noncompetition covenants were
thought to impinge upon the promisor's financial or business
concerns, but not his or her land.3 9
In New Jersey's early common law, then, a promise prohibiting business competition was deemed to enhance the value of the
benefitted parcel; hence, as to the covenantee's interest, the
touch and concern requirement would be met.40 By contrast, the
burden of such a promise was considered personal to the covenantor.4' Thus, it would not, in literal understanding, touch and
Mass. 180, 156 N.E. 867 (1927) (covenant prohibiting operation of grocery business fails to satisfy touch and concern standard); Brewer v. Marshall & Cheeseman,
10 N.J. Eq. 537 (N.J. 1868) (covenant prohibiting grantor from selling marl on retained parcel does not touch and concern burdened estate), overruled by Davidson
Bros. v. Katz, 121 N.J. 196, 579 A.2d 288 (1990); Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 59
Am. Rep. 676 (1886) (deeming unenforceable a covenant precluding use of land
for most commercial purposes), overruled by Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. 163, 60 S.E.2d
1 (1950); Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725, 227 N.E.2d
509 (1967) (covenant not to operate gasoline service station unenforceable at law),
overruled by Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243 (1979);
Savings, Inc. v. City of Blytheville, 240 Ark. 588, 401 S.W.2d 26 (1966) (covenant
not to compete contained in lease agreement); Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear
Lake Utilities Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977) (covenant obliging landowner to
confer exclusive franchise right to utility company held unenforceable, insofar as
promise does not affect the use of land); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537; see generally Bialkin & Bohannan, Covenants Not to Establish a Competing Business - Does the Benefit Pass?, 41 VA. L. REV. 675 (1955) (noting certain courts' use of touch and concern
rule to invalidate covenants to convey "personal" commercial benefit).
36 See, e.g., Brewer v. Marshall & Cheeseman, 10 N.J. Eq. 537 (N.J. 1868); National Union Bank v. Segur, 39 NJ.L. 173, 186 (N.J. 1877); Alexander's Dep't Store
v. Arnold Constable Corp., 105 N.J. Super. 14, 250 A.2d 792 (Ch. Div. 1969); see
infra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
37 See supra note 20 and accompanying text; R. POWELL, supra note 5, at
§ 675[31[b].
38 Stanley Stillwell & Sons v. Caullett, 67 N.J. Super. 111, 116, 170 A.2d 52, 54
(App. Div. 1961).
39 Id. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., National Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N.J.L. 173 (N.J. 1877) (only benefit of covenant not to compete runs with the land, as burden is personal to
promisor).
41 Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 543 comment e, 537 comment f
(while benefit of covenant not to compete will run with promisee's land, burden is
personal to the promisor, and will not bind promisor's successors). The benefit of a
given covenant is personal when transfer of property by the benefitted party does
not automatically confer upon the new owner or possessor entitlement to enforce
the promise. Attendantly, a burden is personal when transfer by the burdened
party does not automatically bind the transferee. See generally Berger, Integration of
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concern the land,4 2 and therefore could not bind successors, no
matter that the original parties may have intended a contrary
result.4 3
So rigid an interpretation effectively displaces bargained-for
duties and entitlements 4 4 while stifling "any possibility of covenants relating to competition. '4 5 Moreover, it misguidedly, if
not naively, suggests that one's fiscal interests exist wholly separate and apart from one's ownership interests, use and enjoythe Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
337, 354 (noting that the question in real covenant or equitable servitude law of
whether the "benefit runs with the land or is personal" is referred to in easement
law as whether the easement is "appurtenant or in gross").
42 Similarly, covenants to pay money were traditionally deemed not to satisfy the
touch and concern requirement. Over time, some courts, confronted with attempts
to enforce against successors such promises to pay money, strained to devise increasingly liberal interpretations of the requirement that the covenant be "of and
pertaining to" the land. For instance, in an oft-noted case, the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that the test for ascertaining if a covenant to pay money touches and
concerns is whether the promise alters the parties' legal relations as landowners. If
the promisor's interest suffers a diminution in value as a consequence of the covenant, the burden touches the promisor's land. If the value of the promisee's interest is enhanced, the benefit touches and concerns the promisee's land. Thus, a
covenant obliging homeowners to contribute sums into a common fund used for
the maintenance of community roads, parks and other public places could satisfy
the test, binding subsequent purchasers who took with notice. This sort of formulation does little to allay concerns of predictability and certainty, however, insofar
as it fails to indicate which promises do touch and concern the land. Moreover, the
standard itself is rather hollow, if not circular. If the given covenant affects the
parties' legal entitlements as landowners, it touches and concerns. Conversely, the
covenant touches and concerns if and when it affects the parties' legal relations.
Neponsit Property Owners' Assoc., Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15
N.E. 2d 793 (1938).
43 For a recitation of various competing views on the propriety ofjudicial refusal
to permit certain land use obligations to bind successors, compare Epstein, Notice
and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1358-60
(1982) (maintaining that economic or fundamental liberty justifications are inadequate to legitimize court-imposed restrictions on contractual freedom to create
binding servitudes) with Reichman,Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STuD.
139 (1978) and Sterk, Freedomfrom Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude
Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REV. 615 (1985) (arguing that existing restrictions safeguard
against economic inefficiencies and compromise of personal liberties).
44 Attendantly, judicial refusal to permit anticompetition covenants to bind successors works unjust enrichment.
To obtain a promise not to compete, the promisee-grantee must pay
the promisor-grantor a greater consideration than if he purchased the
land without such a promise. If the promisor is allowed to remove the
effect of the covenant by a mere transfer of the servient tenement, he,
in effect, has given nothing in return for the price of the promise.
McLoone, supra note 6, at 449-50 (citations omitted).
45 R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 675[3][b].

1991]

"OUT OF TOUCH"

243

ment of his or her land.46 Most fundamentally, it misuses the
touch and concern requirement as a means to avoid covenants
thought to restrain trade. At bottom, thinly disguised public policy concerns (and not some failure of the covenant to touch and
concern the burdened parcel), oftentimes precluded the burden
of an anticompetition covenant from running.4 7
In an attempt to vindicate reasonable expectation and reliance interests while accommodating the realities of present-day
land conveyancing, modern courts to address the matter within
the confines of traditional real covenant analysis have concluded
that both the benefit and the burden of noncompetition covenants are capable of touching and concerning the land. 48 Most

other cases have departed from strict touch and concern formulations, 4 9 holding instead that reasonable anticompetition cove-

nants binding on the originally contracting parties likewise bind
successors who take with notice. 50 In a bold and recent departure from its own firmly rooted precedent, the New Jersey
46 A similar point is made in the context of criticizing the conclusion, reached in
Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885), and its progeny, that the
benefit of a noncompetition covenant confers a financial advantage alone. See
McLoone, supra note 6, at 449, where the author notes:
It is naive to hold that financial values are totally divorced from one's
use and enjoyment of his land. But the Norcross rationale purports to
do just that. It ignores the fact that if one's business can be operated
at a greater profit because the adjoining landowner is precluded from
engaging in a similar type of business, then the market value of the
land for business purposes has been enhanced.
Id.
47 See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935, 86 S.E.2d
128 (1955) (covenant restraining manufacture of pulpwood); Oliver v. Hewitt, 191
Va. 163, 60 S.E.2d 1 (1950) (covenant prohibiting operation of grocery store);
Singer v. Wong, 35 Conn. Supp. 640, 404 A.2d 124 (1978) (covenant forbidding
use as shopping center); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.
1978) (covenant not to operate specified retail enterprises); see generally McLoone,
supra note 6, at 442-43 and cases cited therein (noting that "the great majority of
jurisdictions enforce as an equitable servitude both the benefit and the burden of a
covenant restricting business uses by and against those who succeed to the estates
of the original covenantee and covenantor with notice of the restriction); see also C.
CLARK, supra note 6, at 106; R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 1, at 474-75; R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 675[3][b].
49 See, e.g., Doo v. Packwood, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1968) (covenant not to sell groceries on conveyed parcel); Hall v. Amercian
Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (covenant to refrain from operating
automobile service station); Quadro Stations Inc. v. Gilley, 7 N.C. App. 227, 172
S.E.2d 237 (1970) (covenant not to sell or advertise petroleum related products);
Hercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935, 86 S.E.2d 128 (1955)
(covenant not to operate a manufacturing plant).
50 Id. The proposed Restatement (Third) of Property aims to replace, if not elimi-
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Supreme Court has merged aspects of each of these approaches,
retaining the touch and concern test while crafting an elaborate
standard of "reasonableness" for determining whether a given
restrictive covenant runs to successors. 5 '
Cutting "the gordian knot" which had bound New Jersey's
jurisprudence respecting covenants running with the land, Davidson Bros. v. Katz52 overrules outmoded decisional authority which
had insisted that the burden of a covenant not to compete is personal and does not touch and concern the land.53 Rather than
conclude its analysis there, however, the court holds that the
touch and concern criterion is now but one in a series of extensive factors to be applied in determining whether the noncompetition covenant is reasonable, and therefore, able to bind
successors.54 The contours and propriety of this approach will
be explored in the materials that follow.
COMMON LAW ANTECEDENTS:

NEW JERSEY

CASELAW

Historically, anticompetition covenants were not easily accommodated within the confines of the New Jersey courts' strict
touch and concern analysis. New Jersey's rigid adherence to its
own variant of the touch and concern requirement is readily reflected in Brewer v. Marshall & Cheeseman,55 where the state's
Court of Errors and Appeals56 emphatically declared that the
nate, the touch and concern restriction. Professor Susan French, as Reporter acting under express commission of the American Law Institute, has noted:
The American Law Institute's new servitudes restatement project is
designed to shake servitudes law free from the old controls and
forms .... The touch and concern doctrine provides a prime example.
It identifies neither the problems addressed nor the value choices that
must be made in determining whether to apply it.
French, Servitude Reform and the New Restatement of the Law of Prnperty, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 928, 930 (1988); accord French, supra note 2; see also Epstein, supra note 43, at
1358-60 (urging abolition of touch and concern doctrine, insofar as insistence on
requirement "denies the original parties their contractual freedom by subordinating their desires to the interests of future third parties, who by definition have no
proprietary claim to the subject property"). But see Reichman, supra note 1, at 1233
(supporting retention of touch and concern requirement, insofar as rule preserves
freedom of choice and protects private intentions).
51 Davidson Bros. v. Katz, 121 N.J. 196 579 A.2d 288 (1990)); see infra notes 55117 and accompanying text.
52 121 NJ. 196, 579 A.2d 288 (1990).
53 Id. at 207, 210, 579 A.2d at 293, 295; see infra notes 55-72 and accompanying
text.
54 Id. at 210, 579 A.2d at 295.
55 19 N.J. Eq. 537 (N.J. 1868).
56 The Court of Errors and Appeals served as New Jersey's high court until
1947, when the state ratified its present constitution. See B. RICH, THE GOVERN-
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burden of a covenant will not run with the land unless it quite
literally affects the physical use of the parcel. 57 There, the court
refused to enforce against successors in interest the burden of a
promise not to compete, 58 ruling that the burden of such a covenant is personal to the promisor. 59 Significantly, the court proceeded to declare that noncompetition covenants are
impermissible restraints on trade and illegal per se, "absolutely
void" as a matter of public policy. 6°
Several years later, in National Bank at Dover v. Segur,6 1 the
court ruled that the benefit of a covenant to refrain from competitive land practices does touch and concern the promisee's
land. 62 The court explained that "[a] covenant touches and concerns land when its performance confers a direct benefit on the
owner of land by reason of his ownership; and tested by such 63a
definition, the covenant sued on clearly has such a capacity."
Nonetheless, the court confirmed its position that the burden of a
noncompetition covenant is personal to the promisor, and does
not touch and concern the land.64 Hence, the burden of the
promise would not run.65
This insistence is traceable in considerable part to the historical judicial distaste for restraints on alienation. 66 As an encumbrance on the title to a given parcel of land, a restrictive covenant
could hamper alienability.6 7 While this concern was shared by
other jurisdictions of the day, 68 relative to other state court interMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF NEW JERSEY (1957); G. TARR & M. PORTER, STATE
SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 188-89 (1988).

57 Brewer, 19 N.J. Eq. at 545.
58 Id. At issue in Brewer was whether the burden of a restrictive covenant precluding a real estate vendor from selling "marl" on the parcel of land adjoining the
tract conveyed to vendor's purchaser was enforceable against that purchaser. Id.
59 Id. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
60 Brewer, 19 N.J. Eq. at 546. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
61 39 N.J.L. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1877).
62 Id. at 186.
63 Id.
64 In NationalBank, the plaintiff sought to enforce against the promisor's successor a covenant not to engage in the banking business. Id. at 173-74.
65 Id. at 181.
66 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. As a general matter, the covenant not to compete, unrelated to some "legitimate transaction," is viewed as contrary to public policy and presumptively unlawful, insofar as it is "inimical to the
interests of society in a free competitive market and to the interests of the person
restrained in earning a livelihood."J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 16-19,
at 683 (3d ed. 1987) (citations omitted).
67 See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 2.2, at 35.
68 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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pretations both Brewer and National Bank embraced a noticeably
uncompromising and prosaic vision of the touch and concern requirement as it pertained to covenants not to compete.69
The New Jersey courts' wholesale refusal to permit enforcement of anticompetition covenants against the promisor's successors was relaxed, if not ignored, in subsequent lower court
rulings.70 Still, the rule remained that the covenant had to "exercise direct influence on the occupation, use or enjoyment of the
premises ' 7 1 before it could bind successors, and that the burden
of a promise not to compete fails to satisfy this standard.72
Meanwhile, most jurisdictions had steadily liberalized the touch
and concern requirement, lifting wholesale prohibitions on the
running at law of the burden of noncompetition covenants.73
More than a decade ago, facts began to unfold which ultimately
would present the New Jersey Supreme Court with a meaningful
opportunity to re-examine and then refashion the state's touch
and concern doctrine.
NEW JERSEY'S RE-EMERGENCE:
DA VIDSON BROS. v. KAT z

Salient Facts
In September of 1980, plaintiff Davidson Bros. closed one of
two supermarkets which it had been operating within the city of
69 See generally R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 675[3][b] (both cases reflect an "unnecessarily strict" position). Other courts would find the requirement satisfied by
deeming the given restriction a regulation of the burdened land's potential uses.
See, e.g., Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 115 Conn. 122, 160 A. 432 (1932); Natural
Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 309 Ill. 239, 140 N.E. 840 (1923); see R.
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 1, § 8.15, at 471. A restric-

tive covenant would run with the land if it produced a benefit for the promisee's
land, thereby justifying the burden placed on the use of the promisor's parcel.
Reichman, supra note 1, at 1229.
70 See, e.g., Alexander's v. Arnold Constable Corp., 105 N.J. Super. 14, 28, 250
A.2d 792, 799 (Ch. Div. 1969) (enforcing against successor a promise made by
predecessors not to operate department store); Renee Cleaners, Inc. v. Good Deal
Supermarkets, 89 N.J. Super. 186, 195-96, 214 A.2d 437, 442-43 (App. Div. 1965)
(enforcing against subsequent purchaser promise not to lease property for drycleaning business.) But see Caullett v. Stanley Stillwell & Sons, 67 N.J. Super. 111,
116, 170 A.2d 52, 54-55 (App. Div. 1961) (restrictive covenants must touch and
concern burdened and benefitted parcel in order to run with land).
71 Caullett, 67 N.J. Super. at 116, 170 A.2d at 54-55.
72 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. 163, 60 S.E.2d 1 (1950) (overruling Tardy v.
Creasy, 81 Va. 553 (1886)); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390
N.E.2d 243 (1979) (overruling Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 352
Mass. 725, 227 N.E.2d 509 (1967)); see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.

1991]

"OUT OF TOUCH"

247

New Brunswick. 4 According to Davidson, the store was closed
because competition between the two enterprises had resulted in
diminished profitability. 75 Davidson conveyed the property, located in an urban renewal area, to defendant D. Katz & Sons,
Inc., by deeds 76 which contained a restrictive covenant precluding operation of a supermarket on the parcel for a period of forty
years. 77 Subsequently, Davidson's remaining store allegedly en78
joyed a twenty percent rise in sales and profitability.
The sale to Katz, with its attendant restriction, purportedly
caused hardship to area residents, who were relegated to shopping at local and considerably more expensive convenience
stores or, alternatively, at Davidson's remaining supermarket, situated two miles away. 79 Acting on citizens' complaints, the New
Brunswick Housing Authority endeavored to attract a new food
outlet to the area in which Katz's burdened parcel was situated.8"
After entering into preliminary negotiations with a supermarket
chain, 8 ' the Housing Authority purchased Katz's encumbered
parcel for valuable consideration and with actual notice of the
covenant not to compete. 82 C-Town, a division of the supermarket chain, then acquired at public auction a leasehold interest in
the property.83
74 Davidson Bros. v. Katz, 121 N.J. 196, 199, 579 A.2d 288, 289 (1990).
75 Id. The store had operated at a loss for nearly eight months. Id.

76 Davidson ostensibly shared an interest in the property with a related corporation, Irisondra, Inc. Plaintiff and Irisondra conveyed the property to defendant by
separate deeds which contained the same restrictive covenant. See id.
77 The deeds from Davidson and from Irisondra contained the identical anticompetition covenant:
The lands and premises described herein and conveyed hereby are
conveyed subject to the restriction that said lands and premises shall
not be used as and for a supermarket or grocery store of a supermarket type, however designated, for a period of forty (40) years from the
date of this deed. This restriction shall be a covenant attached to and
running with the lands.
Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 199-200, 579 A.2d at 289-90. Senior citizens and other residents of
nearby housing units were forced to rely on public and other transportation to
purchase food and related provisions from Davidson's remaining store. Id.
80 Id. at 200, 579 A.2d at 290.
81 Id. Representatives of the supermarket chain sought economic assistance
from the City in developing the proposed store. Id.
82 Id. Indeed, the contract for sale executed by the Housing Authority explicitly
referred to both the restrictive covenant and Davidson's intention to seek its enforcement. Id.
83 Id. After the Housing Authority purchased the burdened parcel from Katz, it
"invited proposals for the lease of the property to use as a supermarket. C-Town
was the only party to submit a proposal at a public auction." Id. The lease agree-
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Thereafter, Davidson brought suit against C-Town, the City
of New Brunswick and Katz, later amending its complaint to
name the Housing Authority as an additional defendant.8 4 Plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the restrictive
covenant contained in its deed to Katz bound successors to the
burdened estate. 5 In response to plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, defendants produced evidence probative of the need
for a food retailer in the vicinity of the subject parcel.8 6
The Lower Courts' Rulings
The trial court, relying on Brewer v. Marshall & Cheeseman, 7
concluded in an unreported opinion that the anticompetition
covenant failed to touch and concern the burdened parcel.8 8
Hence, the burden did not run with the land to bind assignees.8 9
Moreover, the trial court noted that established principles of
public policy typically precluded the enforcement of restrictive
covenants not to compete. 90 However, in denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that a factual hearing
would be necessary to discern whether the instant covenant is
reasonable and therefore comports with public policy. 9
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the trial court's
ruling, yet rejected Brewer's strict insistence that the burden of an
anticompetition covenant cannot run with the land.9 2 Instead,
ment provisioned a term of five years at a rent of one dollar per year, contingent on
the lessee's undertaking $10,000 in improvements to the premises. Id. Subsequently, this arrangement was challenged unsuccessfully as violative of the state
constitutional prohibition on public gifts to private parties. See infra notes 85 and
91.
84 Id. at 200-01, 579 A.2d at 290.
85 Id. In a second count, Davidson sought an injunction preventing the leasing
of the parcel on the rent-free basis as violative of the New Jersey Constitution's
proscription on public gifts to private beneficiaries. Id. at 201, 579 A.2d at 290. See
N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 3, paras. 2-3 (1947); see infra note 91.
86 Davidson, 121 N.J. at 201, 579 A.2d at 290. Defendants produced affidavits
from the president of the local tenants' council, the Executive Director of the Housing Authority and the Director of the city's Department of Policy and Economic
Development. Id.
87 Brewer v. Marshall & Cheeseman, 19 N.J. Eq. 537 (N.J. 1868).
88 Davidson, 121 N.J. at 201, 579 A.2d at 290.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. The trial court also rejected plaintiff's challenge to the lease agreement,
finding that the lease advanced an appropriate "public purpose." Id. at 202, 579
A.2d at 290 (quoting Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 207, 199 A.2d 834, 842 (1964)).
92 Davidson, 121 N.J. at 202, 579 A.2d at 291. The appellate division stated that
covenants not to compete could run with the land, and that the two miles separating the interests of the covenantee and the covenantor were not, ipsofacto, a bar to
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the court focused on whether the benefit of the covenant would
run, irrespective of the burden's enforceability. 93 Questioning
Brewer's applicability, the appellate division rather incongruously
posited that the subsequent grantee of defendant Katz's burdened property was not bound by the restriction, because the
benefit of the anticompetition covenant had failed to touch and
concern the parcel retained by plaintiff Davidson. 94 Because the
covenant merely restricted competition from one parcel within a
two mile radius, the court concluded that the value of Davidson's
estate was not enhanced sufficiently to satisfy the court's conception of the touch and concern standard. 95
While the appellate division's ruling laudably moved beyond
Brewer's dubious confines, the court failed to delineate the contours of the new standard it seemingly attempted to set. Indeed,
the court unnecessarily clouded its position on the touch and
concern requirement with an unwarranted analysis of whether
the benefit of Davidson's noncompetition covenant could run
with the land.96 Perhaps ironically, the appellate division's holding reflects the anachronism that Brewer and its progeny had
come to typify in American common law. Against this troubled
backdrop, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification.9 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court's Pronouncement

Writing for the majority of the court, Justice Garibaldi first
examined the law of servitudes' historical and theoretical origins,
noting the subsequent evolution, if not erosion, of many of these
antecedents.9 8 Finding no contemporary support for New
Jersey's blanket prohibition on the enforcement against successors of covenants not to compete, the court overruled the princienforcement. Id. Under the appellate division's approach, considerable spatial distance between the involved parcels is not a bar to a finding that the given noncompetition covenant touches and concerns the benefitted estate. Id.
93

Id.

94

Id.

Id. Curiously, the appellate division acknowledged that operation of a grocery store on the burdened parcel would affect adversely the profits reaped by Davidson's supermarket. Id.
96 The question of whether the benefit of the covenant ran was not before the
court. Conceivably, that inquiry would have been germaine if Davidson had transferred his interest in the benefitted parcel by intervivos conveyance, or if title to the
land had passed from Davidson by devise or intestacy. Still, even if such a successor had brought suit, in the instant case the issue of whether the burden of the
covenant ran would remain dispositive.
97 Davidson Bros. v. Katz, 113 N.J. 655, 552 A.2d 177 (1988).
98 Davidson, 121 N.J. at 203-05, 579 A.2d at 291-92.
95
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pie, articulated in Brewer, that anticompetition covenants cannot
"touch and concern" the promisor's interest as landowner.9 9
Mindful of other jurisdictions' liberalizing interpretations,100 the
court discerned that the touch and concern rule was largely a juristic answer to the early public policy disfavoring restraints on
the alienation of land.' 0 ' That disdain has since yielded to the
realities of modem-day land conveyancing.
Significantly, rather than discard the touch and concern requirement, the court deemed it one in a series of considerations
now relevant to the determination of the aggregate reasonableness of the given covenant,10 2 and hence, whether the covenant
will bind successors. As crafted by the court, the reasonableness
approach requires consideration of 1) the originally covenanting
parties' intent; 2) the covenant's impact on the consideration exchanged at the time that the covenant was executed; 3) whether
the covenant clearly recited the restrictions; 4) whether the covenant was reduced to writing and properly recorded; 5) whether
the covenant's area, time or duration restrictions are reasonable;
6) whether the covenant works an unreasonable restraint on
trade; 7) whether the covenant offends public policy imperatives
and 8) whether the covenant, reasonable at the time it was exeunreasonable as a consequence of
cuted, is now rendered
103
changed circumstances.

99 Id. at 205-07, 579 A.2d at 292-93. The majority noted that lower court decisions in New Jersey had ignored the wholesale restriction against anticompetition
covenants' running with the land. Id. at 206, 579 A.2d at 293 (citing Renee Cleaners, Inc. v. Good Deal Supermarkets, 89 N.J. Super. 186. 214 A.2d 437 (App. Div.
1965); Alexander's v. Arnold Constable Corp., 105 N.J. Super. 14, 250 A.2d 792
(Ch. Div. 1969)); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
100 Id. at 208-09, 579 A.2d at 294. The court observed that many jurisdictions
have rejected strict touch and concern analysis in favor of a broader assessment of
the given covenant's overall reasonableness. Id. (citations omitted). Further, the
majority asserted that those jurisdictions to continue to utilize the "touch and concern" test do so in a fashion that permits noncompetition covenants to run with the
land. Id. at 209, 579 A.2d at 294 ("Even the majority of courts that have retained
the 'touch and concern' test have found that noncompetition covenants meet the
test's requirements.") (citations omitted). See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text.
101 Id. at 210, 579 A.2d at 295.
102 Id. The court stressed, "We do not abandon the 'touch and concern' test, but
rather [hold] that the test is but one of the factors a court should consider in determining the reasonableness of the covenant." Id.
103 Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Pollock extensively critiqued the majority's approach, finding much of the reasonableness test irrelevant to the threshold
determination of the covenant's validity. Rather, the concurrence would deem considerations of reasonableness pertinent only when a court is asked to fashion the
appropriate remedy (i.e., injunctive relief as opposed to an award of money dam-
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Curiously, the touch and concern standard does not appear
within the court's recitation of the salient factors now operative
in this context. 10 4 This omission suggests several competing explanations. It could be that the court did in fact abandon the
touch and concern standard (notwithstanding its perfunctory reference to the contrary),1 ° 5 or so subrogated the traditional formulation as to render it largely incidental. Alternatively, the
court may have intended that the touch and concern requirement
remain a threshold test, to be followed by an evaluation of overall
reasonableness.'0 6 Perhaps most plausibly, insofar as the touch
and concern archetype is linked to the material value of the affected parcels, the standard may be built implicitly into the second of the factors listed by the court, which asks whether the
0 7
covenant had an impact on the "considerations exchanged."'
The majority analogized its "fact sensitive" reasonableness
ages). Id. at 220-23, 579 A.2d at 300-02 (Pollock, J., concurring). See infra notes
133-38 and accompanying text.
104 Davidson, 121 N.J. at 196, 579 A.2d at 288. In the court's words, the eight
factors deemed relevant to the determination of reasonableness are:
1. The intention of the parties when the covenant was executed, and
whether the parties had a viable purpose which did not ....interfere
with existing commercial laws....
2. Whether the covenant had an impact on the considerations
exchanged....
3. Whether the covenant clearly and expressly sets forth the
restrictions.
4. Whether the covenant was in writing, recorded, and ....
[whether], the subsequent grantee had actual notice of the covenant.
5. Whether the covenant is reasonable concerning area, time or
duration....
6. Whether the covenant imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade
or secures a monopoly for the covenantor....
7. Whether the covenant interferes with the public interest....
8.

Whether . . . 'changed circumstances' now make the covenant

unreasonable....
Id. at 211-12, 579 A.2d at 295 (citations omitted).
105 See id. at 210, 579 A.2d at 295 (citations omitted); see supra note 102 and accompanying text..
106 See id. at 209-210, 579 A.2d at 294-95 (noting that "[c]ourts have decided as
an initial matter that covenants not to compete do touch and concern the land. The
courts then have examined explicitly the more important question of whether covenants are reasonable enough to warrant enforcement.").
107 See id. at 211, 579 A.2d at 295 (citing as second factor "whether the covenant
had an impact on the considerations exchanged when the covenant was originally
executed."). See also id. at 205, 579 A.2d at 292 (noting that other jurisdictions
"contend that 'touch and concern' is always, at the very least, an implicit element in
any analysis regarding enforcement of covenants because any restrictive easement
necessitates some relation between the restriction and the land itself.") (citations
omitted).
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test.. to the inquiry applied in the assessment of the enforceability of employee noncompetition covenants. 0 9 Justice Garibaldi
opined that in both settings considerations relevant to the determination of reasonableness afford the flexibility necessary to
weigh the interests of the originally contracting parties, their successors, and the public against an inherently changing commercial environment."O The court thus remanded the case for trial
to resolve numerous outstanding questions of fact"' and to apply the newly promulgated factors.
In an opinion concurring with the majority's decision to remand, Justice Pollock, joined by Justice Clifford, pointedly disagreed with the resort to a reasonableness standard for
determining whether a covenant not to compete is enforceable
against successors. 1 2 In the concurring justices' estimation, concerns of reasonableness, relevant to the determination of the covenant's initial validity and enforceability as between the originally
contracting parties,' 1 3 unnecessarily (and perhaps dangerously)
clutter resolution of the separate question of the covenant's ability to bind successors. 1 4 As to the latter issue, the concurrence
would have overruled Brewer, thereby concluding that noncompetition covenants do touch and concern the land, without adding a
supplementary
and, in their assessment, untenable reasonable5
ness test.'1

IMPLICATIONS
JudicialActivism and the Court's Departurefrom Precedent
The Davidson case joins the New Jersey Supreme Court's
108 Id. at 210, 579 A.2d at 295.
109 Id. at 212, 579 A.2d at 296. An employee covenant not to compete will be

deemed reasonable if it "simply protects the legitimate interests of the employer,
impose [sic] no undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public." Id. (quoting Solar Indus. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (1970)).
110 Id.
"'1 Id. at 215, 579 A.2d at 297. The court noted that while the intention of the
parties was clear, the consideration tendered by Katz was unknown. Id. at 213, 579
A.2d at 296. Further, the majority indicated that allegations made by the defendants regarding the City of New Brunswick's dense population could be probative of
the reasonableness of the covenant's area-based restriction. Id. at 214, 579 A.2d at
297. Finally, the court posited that if changed circumstances precluded an award to
plaintiff of injunctive relief, damages for breach could be factored into the equitable calculus. Id. at 215, 579 A.2d at 297.
112 Id. at 220-22, 579 A.2d at 300-01 (Pollock, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 223, 579 A.2d at 302 (Pollock, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 223-24, 579 A.2d at 302 (Pollock, J., concurring).
1'5 Id. at 222, 223, 579 A.2d at 301, 302 (Pollock, J., concurring).
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well-documented tradition of progressive decision-making. 116
The majority's willingness to abandon antiquated constructs in
favor of standards thought better-equipped to vindicate fundamental fairness reflects in some measure the court's nationally
recognized reputation for principled judicial activism.1 7 The decision's ready departure from dated and strained precedent, coupled with its thorough and creative approach, demonstrates a
larger readiness on the part of the court to effect change by abandoning doctrines that no longer "represent notions of rightness
or fairness."""
Attendantly, the case's departure from the norm of stare deci1
19
sis is consistent with certain of those jurisprudential considerations that are involved when a state court of last resort
announces new law. Adherence to precedent promotes the important aims of predictability, 20 efficiency 12' and stability in the
law. 122 However, the likely absence of widespread reliance on a
given doctrine, coupled with the intervening erosion of its theo116 In diverse categories of actions, the court has departed from established common law doctrine, thereby instituting change. Indeed, the court's common law jurisprudence is replete with illustrations of progressive, if not landmark,
pronouncements. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (privity no longer a bar to automobile manufacturer liability);
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972) (recreating public trust precepts, transforming doctrine obligating sovereign to use land covered by navigable waters for public interest); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980) (overruling established precedent which had
applied adverse possession doctrine to actions involving personalty and announcing instead imposition of "discovery rule"); Kelly v. Gwinell, 92 N.J. 374, 476 A.2d
1219 (1984) (imposing liability on social host for injuries caused by guest who becomes intoxicated and drives). See Franzese, "Georgia on My Mind". Reflections on
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1989) (discussing court's tradition of reform in context of its common law jurisprudence). For analysis of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's progessive and innovative tradition in the arena of
state constitutional adjudication, see Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey
Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30 (1988).
117 See G. TARR & M. PORTER, supra note 56, at 225.
118 Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 34, 141 A.2d 276, 278-79
(1958). In Collopy, the court abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity. Subsequently, the state legislature reinstated the doctrine. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:53A-7 to -11 (West 1986)). See also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
119 Stare decisis, an abbreviation of the Latin maxim stare decisis non quieta movere, has
been construed to mean "[w]hen a rule has been once deliberately adopted and
declared, it ought not to be disturbed ....
" 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 477 (Lacy ed. 1889).
120 See generally R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1961); Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1953).
121 See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921).
122 See generally Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949) ("Stare deci-
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suggests a ready context for deviretical and policy foundations,
12
1
decisis.
stare
from
ating
The perception that Brewer had become an isolated relic,
12 4
coupled with the Davidson lower courts' confused rulings,
clearly facilitated the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisive departure from precedent. 12 5 Indeed, Brewer itself may have been
decided on then prevalent notions of public policy, 126 with the

court's resort to the touch and concern requirement a
gratuituous, if not misguided, subterfuge. Those policies have
and realities of contemporary patsince yielded to the economies
127
terns of land conveyancing.

The Viability of the Multi-FactoredApproach
While the decision to overrule Brewer represents a sound and
welcome pronouncement, the court's imposition of a "reasonableness test" in its place is troublesome. As aptly observed by
the concurrence, resort to a multi-tiered formula of the sort contemplated by the Davidson majority runs the risk of adding unnecessary complexity and8 unpredictability to an area which has long
2
been unduly murky.1

The need for certainty in conveyancing, like that in estate
planning, is necessary for people to structure their affairs.
Covenants that run with the land can affect the value of real
property not only at the time of sale, but for many years thereafter. Consequently, vendors and purchasers, as well as their
successors, need to know whether a covenant will run with the
land.... [T]he majority's reasonableness test generates confu-

sion that threatens the ability of commercial parties and their
lawyers to determine the validity of such covenants. This, in
sis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to a
society.").
123 See B. CARDOZO, supra note 121, at 151:
There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position
when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to
have determined the conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in
its origin it was the product of the institutions or conditions which
have gained a new significance or development with the progress of
the years.
Id.
124 See supra notes 55-97 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
126 The Brewer court noted rather strenuously that noncompetition covenants, as
impermissible "restraints of trade," are "absolutely void." Brewer v. Marshall &
Cheeseman, 19 N.J. Eq. 537, 546-47 (N.J. 1868).
127 See supra notes 49-50, 100 and accompanying text.
128 Davidson, 121 N.J. at 225, 579 A.2d at 302 (Pollock, J., concurring).
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turn, impairs the utility
of noncompetition covenants in real
9

estate transactions.1

The court's all-inclusive reasonableness standard is inherently
amorphous, rendering it susceptible to crafty manipulation, if not
abuse, as one or the other party to a seemingly binding exchange
seeks out of a no longer advantageous bargain.
In this regard, the matter of the appropriate allocation of the
burden of proof is not addressed by the.court. Presumably, the proponent of the given covenant's running to burden successors must
demonstrate the "reasonableness" of such a conclusion. More
problematically, the court does not distinguish the given covenant's
enforceability at law from its enforceability as a servitude in equity.
Could a covenant that fails the reasonableness test be enforced
nonetheless as an equitable servitude?
Certainly, as the majority points out, a judicial approach
grounded in considerations of reasonableness affords courts the
flexibility and latitude to interpose notions of fairness and rightness
when asked to determine the propriety of privately bargained-for
rights and duties. Query, however, whether such expectancies
ought to be disturbed. Equally sophisticated parties bargaining at
arms-length seem the best arbiters of the reasonableness of their
undertakings and entitlements. Similarly, successors to the benefit
or burden of a covenant are freely contracting entities who, in any
event, had to have taken with actual or constructive notice of the
restriction in order to be bound thereby.
Davidson's aggressive formulation, wherein discretionary considerations of public policy and changed circumstances, for example, are pertinent not only during the relief phase of litigation 3 ° but
also factor largely in the threshold determination of the given covenant's lawfulness as against successors, portends unpredictability as
well as the potential for compromise of principles of freedom of
contract. Interestingly, the court's standard merges elements of
13
property law with the affirmative defenses of contract law,
thereby relinquishing, as the concurrence notes, the traditional preId. (Pollock, J., concurring).
See id. at 220-21, 579 A.2d at 300 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock
maintained that these factors should be relegated exclusively to the relief phase of
litigation, relevant to the determination of the propriety of injunctive relief or damages. Id. (Pollock, J., co.icurring).
131 As promulgated by the court, factors one and four address, respectively, the
traditional property law requirements of intent, notice and a sufficient writing. Id.
at 211, 579 A.2d at 295. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. The remaining factors include considerations relevant, for instance, to reformation of a contract. 121 N.J. at 211, 579 A.2d at 295.
129
130
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cept that the "[ilnitial validity [of a covenant] is a question of contract law; enforceability against subsequent parties is one of
property law." 1s 2 While this sort of merger is not presumptively
destined to foster uncertainty, when coupled with so comprehensive
a calculus as is posited by the court, the potential for misuse seems
manifest.
Ultimately, the concurrence should have carried the day. The
court could have found the covenant at issue enforceable against the
successors in interest (C-Town and the Housing Authority) because
it touched and concerned the burdened property and satisfied the
traditional requirements of intent, a writing and notice.'
Transplanting these factors into a larger reasonableness test,'" 4 which invites consideration of matters such as "changed circumstances" and
"public policy," unnecessarily encumbers the inquiry while blurring
the distinction between the covenant's enforceability on the one
hand and the appropriate remedy for its enforcement on the other.
The newly introduced criteria, such as whether changed circumstances warrant the refusal to uphold an otherwise enforceable covenant, 3 5 or "whether the covenant interferes with the public
interest,"'13 6 are best factored into the relief phase of the adjudication, when the court is called upon to assess the propriety of injunctive relief as opposed to an award of damages.' 3 7 By contrast,
rendering these considerations relevant to the determination of
threshold "reasonableness" offers a license for unwarranted judicial
intrusion into private affairs, and represents a hazy amalgamation of
38
property and contract law.'
CONCLUSION
Against a backdrop of confounding and antiquated precedent, Davidson Bros. v. Katz presented an opportunity for the New
Jersey Supreme Court to clarify, simplify and modernize a rather
disjunctive and out-dated methodology for determining the enforceability of noncompetition covenants. The court rightly concluded that noncompetition covenants can touch and concern the
Davidson, 121 N.J. at 221, 579 A.2d at 300 (Pollock, J., concurring).
Id. at 223, 579 A.2d at 302 (Pollock, J., concurring).
As the concurrence observed, the majority's reasonableness test embraced
the elements of intent, writing and notice typically required for a covenant to run.
Id. at 227-28, 579 A.2d at 304 (Pllock, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 212, 579 A.2d at 295.
136 Id.
'37 Id. at 220-21, 579 A.2d at 300 (Pollock, J., concurring).
138 Id. at 229, 579 A.2d at 305 (Pollock, J., concurring).
132
'33
134
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land, thereby appropriately overruling stubborn precedent to the
contrary. Consistently applied, the touch and concern formulation fosters predictability, honors expectation interests and vindicates concerns of reasonableness.
However, Davidson's imposition of a comprehensive, eightpronged reasonableness test for determining whether the restrictive covenant will indeed run with the land unnecessarily clutters
the inquiry. The all-inclusive examination ordained by the court
threatens to add confusion and uncertainty as, for example, participants to a land transaction attempt to determine the validity
and subsequent enforceability of bartered-for covenants not to
compete or, alternatively, seek to manipulate the standard's various components as a way out of a bad bargain. Indeed, the test's
invitation to assess such factors as the covenant's compatibility
with the public interest13 9 or whether, even if initially reasonable,
it is now unreasonable as a consequence of "changed circumstances,"' 140 creates the potential for less than merited judicial
displacement of privately allocated risks and expectancies.
The court's pronouncement, then, while comprehensive and
comprehensible, is unlikely to facilitate the important interests of
predictability and certitude. Inevitably, future litigation will attempt to mold the intrinsically malleable and imprecise parameters of the new test.
139
140

Id. at 211, 579 A.2d at 295.
Id.

